Later in the 1990s, Thomas Uber elaborated the theory of compound warfare, characterized by what he termed the simultaneous use of regular and guerrilla forces against an opponent. At first, Walt expressed his desire to minimize conventional search-and-destroy missions against large Communist units to maximize counterinsurgency operations. Doing so would result in the failing of the foreign forces main task: build up the local governments administrative machinery and the experience of the individuals meant to take over the campaign.37 Although rice paddies were but one landscape in-country, they serve as a powerful and evocative symbol of the conflict. ProQuest folder 003233-001-0731. Our editors will review what youve submitted and determine whether to revise the article. In Vietnam, the NVA and Viet Cong guerrillas both fought for a common political and strategic purpose: South Vietnams unification with the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (North Vietnam). Communist losses amounted to 240,000 killed and wounded in 1968, which included many political cadres who were exposed and neutralized during the fighting.51 These devastating losses created a huge political and control vacuum in South Vietnams villages. Since then, he completed his PhD in history at Laval University in Quebec, Canada, and retired from the military. The main strategy and tactics of guerrilla warfare tend to involve the use of a small attacking, mobile force against a large, unwieldy force. For the most part, the Viet Cong fought essentially a guerrilla war of ambush, terrorism, and sabotage; they used small units to maintain a hold on the countryside, leaving the main population centres to government authorities. It also was one of David Galulas central tenets. When U.S. combat forces were deployed to South Vietnam in 1965, the country was on the verge of total collapse. However, such a common goal did not imply that Hanois politburo and Viet Cong members were united under a single banner, a subject that will be addressed later. CAP Marines and South Vietnamese paramilitary forces preparing for an ambush against the Viet Cong. Should the Marines have been more in the background rather than directly involved with the Popular Force in CAP, the program would probably have been through additional setbacks in the short term. In the process, we lost sight of one of the cardinal maxims of guerrilla war: the guerrilla wins if he does not lose. Moreover, a thorough analysis of Westmorelands papers clearly shows that the U.S. Army general had, indeed, a solid battle plan that aimed to conduct counterinsurgency alongside conventional operations in Vietnam. The NVA operated in the vicinity of the demilitarized zone (DMZ), the Central Highlands, and near the borders of Laos and Cambodia, while the Viet Cong deployed its main force in the populated areas located in South Vietnams lowlands. However, it would have pushed the South Vietnamese to be self-reliant and less dependent on their Marine counterparts. Jan 30, 1968 CE: Tet Offensive - National Geographic Society The system worked admirably in Malaya, where the British trained hundreds of thousands of local Home Guard soldiers who were the leading counterinsurgents in the field. Communist forces occupied the peoples houses, dug up trenches, and set up defensive positions that several companies could occupy.22 Such a situation resulted in multiple firefights in the vicinity of rural villages. 2023, A&E Television Networks, LLC. This is the terrain that the Vietcong have made their own. The resolution ordered guerrilla forces to focus their targeting operations on pacification personnel in rural areas. To support the South's government, the United States sent in 2,000 military advisors--a number that grew to 16,300 in 1963. The cadres will then recruit new fighters among the population under their control to refill unit B ranks. As stated by CORDS veteran Stephen Young: A remarkable success in the development of associative power to defeat a powerful insurgency was achieved [with] the CORDS program. Comme l'indique le galon de bless sur son uniforme, cette photo fut prise aprs 1918, le service d'Ormsby ayant pris fin. This responsibility was shared by the District Intelligence and Operations Coordinating Center (DIOCC).66 The DIOCCs primary function was to collect relevant intelligence that could be used to plan operations against the Communist cadres at work in the districts villages. Colby noted that the neglect observed in the previous year was, by the end of 1968, a thing of the past; South Vietnamese officials realized that Thieu was serious about enforcing the APC. S. Army Art Collection. Problems of a North Vietnamese Regiment, docs. HISTORY reviews and updates its content regularly to ensure it is complete and accurate. All Rights Reserved. The Viet Cong - Alpha History Ismal Fournier served 19 years in the Canadian armed forces. During the Tet Offensive of 1968, the Viet Cong suffered devastating losses, and their ranks were later filled primarily by North Vietnamese soldiers. Its success in defeating the Viet Cong insurgency was accomplished in the Spring of 1972.90. In January 1966, some 8,000 U.S. and Australian troops attempted to sweep the Cu Chi district in a large-scale program of attacks dubbed Operation Crimp. ReportsVIET CONG/NVN Propaganda Analysis 1970, Memorandum GVN 1969 Pacification Development Plan, 180. At this point, Viet Cong leadership acknowledged that it was incapable of regaining the initiative against the counterinsurgents and admitted that government forces had the upper hand. Vietcong Guerilla & Tactics | Who were the Vietcong? | Study.com In 1967, he participated in a veritable bureaucratic struggle to force military planners to better coordinate their efforts to properly support the paramilitary forces and government cadres deployed in rural South Vietnam.44 Earlier in 1966, during the Manila Conference, President Lyndon B. Johnson and his South Vietnamese counterpart Nguyen Van Thieu agreed that ARVN forces should shift the bulk of their efforts to support pacification.45 Some U.S. and ARVN battalions assigned to assist the counterinsurgents managed to keep large Viet Cong units at bay. The infrastructure was active at the regional, provincial, district, village, and hamlet levels in South Vietnam (figure 1). Although it took several years of adjustments coupled with multiple setbacks, U.S. and South Vietnamese forces undeniably defeated the Viet Cong insurgency in 1972. The hybrid war in Vietnam was the consequence of Hanois strategy, which exploited both conventional and unconventional warfare tactics, requiring a symmetrical U.S. military response. Vietnam was a hybrid warfare theater, which required the Americans to fight both the Viet Cong guerrillas and Hanois conventional forces. It was filled with North Vietnamese soldiers who may have excelled at conventional warfare but failed as guerrilla fighters. Until the end of 1968, conventional forces paid little attention to the counterinsurgents who struggled to accomplish their tasks when confronted with fully armed Communist battalions. The end game: how did the Viet Cong win? | The Past 4 What was the advantage of the Viet Cong? 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Vietcong military tactics Despite having no aircraft, tanks or artillery of their own, the Vietcong managed to hold out against the Americans until the USA left Vietnam in the. The same can be said had U.S. forces ignored the large NVA divisions that roamed the Central Highlands and border areas of the DMZ, Laos, and Cambodia. The Viet Cong (can be abbreviated as VC, sometimes spelled as Vietcong), officially the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam, was an armed communist organization in South Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia.It fought under the direction of North Vietnam against the South Vietnamese and United States governments during the Vietnam War.It had both guerrilla and regular army units, as well as a . CORDS managed to attain the middle ground between the exploitation of hard power and soft power. That middle ground was embodied by what Young calls associative power.41 The program used hard power to protect the villages and disrupt the Viet Congs infrastructure, economic power to support civic actions, and political power to conduct elections. The early insurgent activity in South Vietnam against Diems government was initially conducted by elements of the Hoa Hao and Cao Dai religious sects. The initiative was first proposed by Komer and his deputy, William E. Colby, who would become Komers successor as the head of CORDS. However, such a common goal did not imply that Hanoi's politburo and Viet Cong members were united under a single banner, a subject that will be addressed later. The US and Australian tried a variety of methods to detect and infiltrate the tunnels but all were met with failure. The Vietnam War: Was it Necessary? | RallyPoint Rural Guerrilla War as exemplified by the Cuban revolutionary war by the 26th of July Movement and their 'Jungle War' in the Sierra Maestra mountains in the 1950s or the Khmer Rouges in Cambodia in the 1970s and the PLAF (Viet Cong) in Vietnam in the 1960/70s. Called the "American War" in Vietnam (or, in full, the "War Against the Americans to Save the Nation"), the war was also part of a larger regional . Authors like Mark Moyar and Phoenix veteran Lieutenant Colonel John L. Cook both set the record straight regarding Phoenix.64 Targeting an insurgencys political infrastructure is a crucial aspect of counterguerrilla warfare. Two central problems plagued CORDS: the lack of discipline of several of its members and the threat posed by larger Viet Cong units. Though beginning in the mid-1950s as a collection of various groups opposed to the government of President Diem, the Viet Cong became in 1960 the military arm of the National Liberation Front (NLF). Consultation of multiple Communist reports written between 1968 and 1971 exposes the COSVNs obsession with the South Vietnamese pacification campaign, which is repeatedly labeled as the strategic target of the insurgency. 1970, box 7, Records of the U.S. Finally, U.S. officials continued with their efforts to rebuild South Vietnam's weak and unpopular government. Guerilla Cuisine: a Comparison of Various Food Provisioning Methods of A few months later, confronted with its subordinates inability to follow the directives of Resolution 9, the COSVN published Resolution 14, which insisted again on the need to revert to a guerrilla warfare concept to overcome the enemys pacification program. In the heart of the villages, RD cadres that would usually dismantle the insurgencys political infrastructure were too frightened to operate in the districts hamlets proactively.50 No elections occurred in the villages controlled by the Viet Cong. Former Viet Cong Guerrillas Tell Their Story | AP News Through the cooperation of multiple civilian, military, and intelligence agencies, CORDS achieved its main operational goals by the spring of 1972. guerilla warfare was difficult to combat, high US casualties rates, US goals were unclear, draft was unfair, more minorities and low-income citizens were forced to serve in the war (disadvantaged due to race and social class) They used small units to maintain a hold on the countryside, leaving the main urban areas to government authorities. 45K views The Vietnam War The Vietnam War started as a conflict between Vietnam and France, which had colonized parts of Southeast Asia in the 19th and early 20th centuries. Re-emphasis on Pacification, 19651967, ID 5890510, Pentagon Papers, Part IV.C.8, container ID 6, NARA, 116. Throughout the Vietnam War, the Vietcong repeatedly proved themselves to be a formidable enemy, due in large part to their use of guerrilla warfare, something that the U.S. troops were not very . Lewis Sorley criticized Westmorelands so-called reluctance in executing counterinsurgency in Westmoreland: The General Who Lost Vietnam. The concept was similar to what British field marshal Gerald Templer conceptualized when he managed the war effort against the Communist insurgency in Malaya. The Viet Nam Negotiations - JSTOR This explains why U.S. troops constantly had to secure the same area on multiple occasions. Colby also stressed the importance of dispatching conventional forces to assist the counterinsurgents in the eventuality of the deployment of large Communist formations.52 Figure 3. Overall, the Corps losses were 2.4 times greater than those suffered by the Popular Force.34 Furthermore, the fighting that involved the Popular Force during the Tet offensive showed the Americans that paramilitary forces, supported by their resources alone, could not ensure CAPs survival.35 The situation exposed an apparent flaw in the programs execution: Americans were the CAP initiatives main protagonists. As the NVA reorganized its forces, it prepared for the final offensive to invade South Vietnam. It also sent hundreds of thousands of American soldiers into South Vietnam to fight Viet Cong guerrillas (small groups of fighters who launch surprise attacks) and North Vietnamese troops. Figure 2. Encyclopaedia Britannica's editors oversee subject areas in which they have extensive knowledge, whether from years of experience gained by working on that content or via study for an advanced degree. Closeup of the Vietcong in Their Jungle; A French reporter held Tactically, the guerrilla army makes the repetitive attacks far . Richard M. Nixon, Sir Robert Thompson (1971) Memorandum for the President, Subject: Sir Robert Thompson Comments on Vietnam, Presidential Materials Project, folder 102564-018-0391, NARA, 1. What was one advantage the Viet Cong guerrillas had? - Quora The committee admitted that their forces were poor in quality and quantity and unable to establish contact with the population. Such control by the cadres is enforced with smaller or larger local fighting units (B and C). In the book Hybrid Warfare, the term refers to a conflict that involves a combination of conventional military forces and irregular units, which may include both state and nonstate actors, aimed at achieving a common political purpose.6 the Viet Cong made their claim stick. Evolution of the War. A VCI deserter admitted that the Viet Cong feared Phoenix, which was trying to destroy its organizations and denied its cadres access to the civilian population.72 He also stated that insurgents who did not have to deal with villagers received very specific instructions: contacts with the population were prohibited due to Phoenix agents overwhelming presence in rural areas. They were supervised and led by British and Australian officers.38 The CORDS initiative was better adapted than CAP for Vietnam. U.S. advisors would be dispatched to advise the South Vietnamese administrators and cadres of the Revolutionary Development (RD) group charged with the supervision of pacification efforts. North Vietnamese and VC troops slipped back within months of the sweep, and in early 1968 they would use the tunnels as a stronghold in their assault against Saigon during the Tet Offensive. Tactical management of the program fell under American and South Vietnamese intelligence officers (S2). Forces in South East Asia, 19501975, NND 974306, RG 472, entry 33205, NARA, 1415, hereafter Remarks of Col James B. Egger. Although North Vietnamese and Viet Cong troops cooperated and occasionally conducted joint operations, they usually operated in different areas. 8. Figure 5. Lesson 9: The Vietnam War Flashcards | Quizlet At the beginning of 1970, CORDS achieved most pacification objectives, with 90 percent of the population living in hamlets enjoying acceptable security and 50 percent living in areas considered completely secure.85 During rural elections in 1970, 97 percent of populated areas could vote freely with no significant Viet Cong interference.86 Ho Chi Minh, the leader of the Viet Minh (Vietnamese Independence League) and the founder of Vietnam's Communist Party, successfully blended . However, as with CORDS, the program drastically improved after Tet. Several schools of thought identified similar branches or types of warfare that can also be associated with Vietnam. The guerrilla tactics of the Vietcong were very effective for a number of reasons. In 1967, the Americans and South Vietnamese launched the Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS) program, which aimed to curtail the Viet Congs influence in the rural villages and pacify the countryside. In 1969 the NLF joined other groups in the areas of South Vietnam that were controlled by the Viet Cong to form the Provisional Revolutionary Government (PRG). Portrait en studio de George Ormsby, de sa femme Maggie et de leurs enfants Margaret et Hugh. U.S. regular units shielded the counterinsurgents from the remainder of the insurgencys battalions, leaving the guerrillas to fend for themselves. For instance, in 1969, the U.S. Armys 173d Airborne Brigade launched a counterinsurgency campaign in Binh Dinh that was an exact replica of the Corps CAP.59 In Quang Ngai, U.S. Army units launched the Infantry Company Intensive Pacification Program, another copy of the CAP.60 While it remains speculative, it is unlikely that Westmoreland would have gone so far as to allow a whole U.S. infantry brigade to emulate the Corps CAP system. It aimed at deploying Marine squads in villages alongside paramilitary forces. For more, see pg 78. Each hamlet now benefited from the protection of a platoon of paramilitary forces assisted by village militias.62 Across the whole country, control of Communist cadres over the rural population collapsed to 12.3 percent, then to 3 percent. They both understood that to gain the initiative and negate the Viet Congs political influence, government officials had to take the offensive and retake the legitimate control of the contested areas. Author John A. Nagl claimed that the U.S. Army resisted any true attempt to learn how to fight an insurgency but preferred to treat Vietnam as a conventional war.1 Andrew F. Krepinevich stated that the U.S. militarys approach to Vietnam was unidimensional and that a traditional approach to warfare was adopted in Vietnam with conventional war doctrines.2 Lewis Sorley underlined how U.S. Military Assistance Command Vietnams (USMACV) commanding officer, General William C. Westmoreland, marginalized counterinsurgency in favor of conventional war tactics.3 Max Boot branded the conventional war effort as futile in Vietnam and claimed that the Americans defeat was mainly the result of a military establishment that tried to apply a conventional strategy to an unconventional conflict.4 In the areas dominated by the Viet Cong, the infrastructure acted as an official government. While the U.S. Marines CAP program was in many ways a textbook counterinsurgency strategy, it lacked this particularity as the South Vietnamese became too reliant on the Marines for support. Forces in South East Asia, 19501975, NND 974306, RG 472, entry: 33104, NARA, 3. Much literature has been dedicated to Westmorelands views on how the war had to be fought. The first phase aimed at dispatching conventional units to push away the enemys large battalions from populated areas. This article goes against these theories and suggests U.S. and South Vietnamese forces soundly defeated the insurgency, militarily and politically, through both the CORDS program and the support of regular military units. While the Marines role was central, the programs main objective was to create the conditions for an orderly phase-out of the Americans once the Popular Force improved sufficiently to take over the mission by themselves.36 Thompson emphasized that foreign agencies must resist the temptation to take over the host nation actors function, thinking they will do a better job. Such a course of action requires time to perfect, especially for a military force bred to fight against Soviet divisions. The program had offices in all the countrys provinces and districts (figure 5). Portrait de la famille Ormsby. Villagers cultivated 5.1 million metric tons of rice without the Viet Cong being able to benefit from it. Omissions? GVN INSP RPTS 1970 MACCORDS Realignment of Phuong Hoang Management Responsibilities, 1. In The Insurgents, Fred Kaplan wrote that CORDS was a mixed success at best.10 In Counterinsurgency, Douglas Porch branded CAPs and CORDS as promising initiatives that were underresourced and developed too late to alter the course of the war. However, given the South Vietnamese Armys poor state in 1975, the prospect of an ARVN victory against fully trained and supplied NVA divisions was hopeless.
